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INTRODUCTION
In 1930, the Supreme Court decided two cases and reached seem-
ingly contradictory results regarding the ability of a married couple to
receive preferential tax treatment by one spouse diverting income to the
other.' The distinction between the two cases lay in the legal instrument
t See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT oF EQuITY 178-202 (2001) (suggesting that
"More than Money is Involved" in the history of various tax measures that were con-
sidered during the 1930s and 1940s).
* Law clerk, the Honorable Robert A. Karzmann, United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit; J.D. 2004, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Compare Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930) (holding that the taxpayer should
be taxed for all of his earnings, regardless of a contract between him and his wife that
provided that all earnings would be owned by them as "joint tenants"), with Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930) (holding the taxpayer liable for taxes on only half
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that operated to divert that income. In the first case, Lucas v. Earl, a
husband and wife entered into a contractual agreement that assigned
half of the husband's income to his wife.2 In contrast, Poe v. Seaborn
considered Washington state's community property statutes, which
automatically diverted income from a husband to his wife.3 The Court
held that where one spouse diverted income to the other by virtue of a
private, contractual agreement, as in Earl, the couple was not entitled to
file separate returns, each reporting only half of the household's total
income. However, where one spouse diverted income to the other by
operation of the state's community property regime, as in Seaborn, the
couple was entitled to file separate returns with each spouse reporting
only half of the income earned.
Significant tax consequences resulted from the ability of one spouse
to divert income to the other. At the time Earl and Seaborn were de-
cided, there was only one tax schedule used by all taxpayers, and
husband and wife were treated as separate taxpayers. In addition, tax
liability increased rapidly as income rose, imposing a heavy burden on
the nation's taxpayers in the post-World-War-I and World-War-II era.
For example, in 1944, a taxpayer was taxed at a marginal tax rate of
fifty-nine percent on income between $20,000 and $22,000 and paid as
much as ninety-four percent of his income in taxes for income over
$200,000.' The ability to divert income from one spouse to another
consequendy allowed married couples to shift some of the household's
income to a lower marginal tax rate. For example, if a husband earned
$22,000 in wages in 1944, the ability to divert his income to his wife for
income tax purposes subjected both husband and wife to only a forty-
one percent marginal tax rate, rather than the husband alone being sub-
jected to the fifty-nine percent rate. This shifting of income would
reduce the household's income taxes from $9,040 to $6,700, resulting
in the addition of $2,340 to a married couple's after-tax income.
of his earnings, while his wife was liable for taxes on the other half, because his earn-
ings constituted community property).
2. 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930).
3. 282 U.S. 101, 110 (1930).
4. Tax Policy Center, Tax Facts, available at www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/
individual/brackets 1944.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2005) (citing JOSEPH PERCHMAN,
FEDERAL TAx POLICY (1987)).
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In response to the disparate treatment of taxpayers that resulted
from Earl and Seaborn, a flurry of states adopted community property
statutes between 1939 and 1947-Michigan,6 Nebraska,7 Oklahoma,8
Oregon,9 and Pennsylvania.' Eight states-Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington-already had
community property laws in place." Before other states could similarly
adopt community property statutes, 2 Congress responded with the
Revenue Act of 1948, which stated, in pertinent part, "[el qualization is
provided for the tax burdens of married couples in common-law and
community property States." 3 The Revenue Act achieved such equaliza-
tion by allowing husbands and wives to file one return together-that is,
a joint return 14-and calculating the tax liability on the joint income by
determining the tax liability on half the income and multiplying that
figure by two. 5 In less than a year after the adoption of the Revenue Act
of 1948, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon repealed their
5. See Godfrey N. Nelson, Need to Equalize Taxes on Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1947, at Fl.
6. SeeAct of July 1, 1947, No. 317, 1947 Mich. Pub. Acts 517 (codified as amended at
MICH. COMp. LAws § 557.201-.220 (1947)) (repealed 1948).
7. See Act of June 12, 1947, ch. 156, 1947 Neb. Laws 426 (codified as amended at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-601 to 616 (1947)) (repealed 1949).
8. See Act of May 10, 1939, ch. 62, 1939 Okla. Sess. Laws 190 (codified as amended at
OIKLA. STAT. § 51-65 (1941)) (repealed 1945).
9. See Act of Mar. 29, 1943, ch. 440, 1943 Or. Laws 656 (codified as amended at OR.
REv. STAT. § 63-2AO1 to 2A16 (1945)) (repealed 1945); Act of Apr. 19, 1947, ch.
525, 1947 Or. Laws 910 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAr. § 63-2B01 to 2B16
(1947)) (repealed 1949).
10. See Act of July 7, 1947, ch. 550, 1947 Pa. Laws 1423 (to be codified at PA. STAT.
ANN. § 201-15 (1947)); Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1947)
(holding Pennsylvania's community property law unconstitutional); Godfrey N. Nel-
son, Test Upsets Law Affecting Spouses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1947, at Fl.
11. WILLIAM QUINBY DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 56 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D].
12. In September of 1947, The New York Times reported that "the Legislature of the
State of New York may soon consider the advisibility [sic] of ... adoption" of com-
munity property laws. Godfrey N. Nelson, Community Taxes ofIncome Spread, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1947, at Fl. At the same time, Kentucky saw strong support for
community property legislation developing, while in North Dakota, legislation was
under consideration at the time the Revenue Act of 1948 became effective. COMMU-
NITY PROPERTY 2D, supra note 11, at 89 n.77.
13. H.R. REP. No. 80-1274 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1258, 1258; see also
S. REP. No. 80-1013 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1163.
14. I.R.C. 5 51(b)(1) (1949).
15. I.R.C. § 12(d) (1949) ("In the case of a joint return of husband and wife ... the
combined normal tax and surtax.. . shall be twice the combined normal tax and sur-
tax that would be determined if the net income and the applicable credits against net
income provided by section 25 were reduced by one-half.").
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community property statutes. 16 Pennsylvania may have, as well, had the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court not already found its state's community
property laws unconstitutional.
1 7
These facts raise at least two interesting questions. First, was the
adoption of community property regimes motivated by the beneficial
tax treatment of married couples or was more than money involved?
Second, what underlying facts and social conditions led such laws to be
adopted with little fear of wives' newly created property rights?
Part I of this article reviews the legal landscape that provided the
backdrop against which Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania later adopted community property laws. It also examines
the tax consequences of the two Supreme Court cases, Lucas v. Earl and
Poe v. Seaborn, that resulted in the disparate tax treatment of married
couples in common law and community property law states. Part II
briefly reviews the subsequent passage of community property laws by
Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Pennsylvania; the passage
of a federal tax reduction bill that provided for equal treatment of com-
munity property law and common law jurisdictions; and the subsequent
history of those laws in each of the five states. The immediate repeal by
Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon of their community prop-
erty laws following passage of the Revenue Act of 1948 suggests that the
passage of the community property laws was simply a tax saving meas-
ure. This is the belief of some reputable scholars. 8 This article does not
refute that such laws were passed, in part, to achieve tax savings; how-
ever, it does suggest that other social forces were at work, as well.
Part III of this article suggests that legislatures were able to pass
community property laws, in part, because they gave little in the way of
rights to wives, but went far, symbolically, in building married women's
confidence that their household responsibilities were worth a portion of
their husbands' salaries. Such confidence was necessary if the pre-war
social order, with women primarily in the home rather than the work-
force, was going to be successfully reinstated after the war. This Part
examines the social and cultural context in which a few states passed
16. See supra notes 6-9.
17. Nelson, supra note 10, at F1.
18. Professor Martin D. Ginsburg has described the passage of the community property
laws as a reaction to the favorable tax treatment of married taxpayers in community
property law states. Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Fall 2002 Georgetown University
Law Center Tax I Lecture (Nov. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Tax I Lecture]. Professor
Daniel Ernst commented similarly during an informal discussion. But see KESSLER-
HARRIs, supra note t, at 197 ("[Splitting income] provided persuasive economic in-
centives for most married women to file jointly with their husbands and even to stay
out of the labor force." (Emphasis added.)).
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community property laws together with the legislative debate in Penn-
sylvania-the only state for which a substantive legislative history is
available--over the passage of its community property law. Part IV con-
cludes that although states passed community property laws, in part, for
the tax benefits, more than money was involved.
1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Consistent Supreme Court?
In Lucas v. Earl,9 the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer, Mr.
Earl, was taxable for the whole of his salary earned for the years in ques-
tion, regardless of a contract between Mr. Earl and his wife that
provided that his salary belonged to the Earls jointly.0 In 1901, Mr.
Earl and his wife entered into a contract, which provided, in part, that
"any property either of us now has or may hereafter acquire ... in any
way, . . (including salaries, fees, etc.), . . . shall be treated and consid-
ered, and hereby is declared to be received, held, taken, and owned by
us as joint tenants."21 The couple entered into the contract because Mr.
Earl had been ill, and he believed such an agreement would simplify
Mrs. Earl's affairs in the event of his death.2 Assuming that their con-
tract vested half of Mr. Earl's earnings in Mrs. Earl, each reported half
of Mr. Earl's earnings in 1920 and 1921. Noting that the case was "not
to be decided on attenuated subtleties," Justice Holmes held that Mr.
Earl was liable for the tax on all of his earnings, reasoning that "the tax
could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts how-
ever skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even
for a second in the man who earned it."
23
It is interesting to note that Mr. and Mrs. Earl entered into the
contract at issue in 1901, before the adoption of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution,24 which allowed the federal government to
impose a federal income tax. In addition, it was not until 1913 that the
first federal income tax legislation became law. 5 Thus, Mr. and Mrs.
Earl's contract could hardly be described as one "skillfully devised" to
19. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
20. Id. at 114-15.
21. Earl, 281 U.S. at 113-14.
22. Earl v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 10 B.T.A. 723, 723 (B.T.A. 1928).
23. Earl, 281 U.S. at 115.
24. The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted in 1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
25. The Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Star. 114, 166 (1913) (codified as I.R.C.
§ 2(A) (1913)).
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prevent the payment of income tax. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
extinguished any income tax benefits arising from such contracts.
Eight months after Earl, the Supreme Court decided Poe v.
Seaborn,26 which held that Mr. and Mrs. Seaborn were entitled to file
separate returns, each reporting only half of their joint income by virtue
of the community property laws operating in Washington state, where
they lived.27 In 1927, the tax year in question, the Seaborns' income was
comprised of Mr. Seaborn's salary; interest on bank deposits, bonds, and
dividends; and profits on the sale of real and personal property. 8 All of
the real estate was in Mr. Seaborn's name alone.2 9 Nonetheless, the
Court noted that it was "undisputed that all of the property real and
personal constituted community property and that neither owned any
separate property or had any separate income.""0 The Court reasoned
that the Seaborns' property in question vested in the community first:
"[T]he earnings are never the property of the husband, but that of the
community., 3' In contrast, Mr. Earl's property vested in him first; oth-
erwise there would be nothing for Mr. Earl to contract away. 2 Because
the property in the Seaborns' case belonged to the community and,
thus, Mrs. Seaborn had a vested property right equal to that of her hus-
band, the Seaborns could split Mr. Seaborn's income and each would
pay taxes on only half of their total income.
Two points of the Seaborn case are noteworthy. First, the Court re-
jected the Internal Revenue Commissioner's argument that Mrs.
Seaborn did not have a vested interest in the community property be-
cause the management and control of the property was delegated to Mr.
Seaborn. The Court reasoned that "[t]he community must act through
an agent.,3 3 And the husband merely served as that agent, "[t]his right
being vested in him, not because he was the exclusive owner, but be-
cause by law he was created the agent of the community."3 4 This was the
31customary understanding in community property regimes.
26. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
27. Id. at 118.
28. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 108-09.
29. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 109.
30. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 109.
31. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 117.
32. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 117; see Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
33. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 112.
34. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 112.
35. See WILLIAM QUINBY DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 262, 322
(I st ed. 1943) [hereinafter COMMUNITY PROPERTY 1 ST].
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Second, the Court concluded that the wife's interest was no less
real simply because the state of Washington limited the wife's ability to
"call [her husband] to account in a court."" The Court reasoned,
The reasons for conferring such sweeping powers of manage-
ment on the husband are not far to seek. Public policy
demands that in all ordinary circumstances, litigation between
wife and husband during the life of the community should be
discouraged. Law-suits between them would tend to subvert
the marital relation. The same policy dictates that third parties
who deal with the husband respecting community property
shall be assured that the wife shall not be permitted to nullify
his transactions.37
Thus, although a wife in the state of Washington had neither the
right to manage and control the community property, nor the ability to
seek remedial relief for a husband's violation of his duty to administer
the community property, the Court concluded that the wife had a pre-
sent vested interest in such property. A vested interest in the community
property was sufficient, for tax purposes, to allow the Seaborns to split
Mr. Seaborn's income.
Despite Justice Holmes's claim that Earl was "not to be decided on
attenuated subdeties," the Court reconciled the seemingly contradictory
outcomes of Earl and Seaborn by making metaphysical distinctions
about when, and in whom, property vests. The two cases are better ex-
plained, however, by principles of federalism. "In deference to principles
of property ownership, [the courts] declared that federal tax policy could
not override claims to property whose legitimacy was rooted in the laws
of the several states. '30
B. Adding it Up
The Supreme Court's disparate treatment of common law and
community property law states effected substantial tax consequences.
The post-World-War-I tax schedule, which increased tax liability
rapidly as income rose, imposed a heavy burden on taxpayers. In
36. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 113.
37. Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 112.
38. KESSLER-HARRis, supra note t, at 175. Professor Martin D. Ginsburg has also ex-
plained that the Supreme Court has often been especially deferential to state property
law. Tax I Lecture, supra note 18.
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addition, only one tax schedule applied to individuals and married
persons alike, and husband and wife were treated as separate taxpayers.
Thus, in common law states, if the husband was the only wage earner, as
his income rose, it was taxed at a higher marginal tax rate. In contrast,
in community property states, if the husband was the only wage earner,
half of the husband's income would be taxed as though the wife had
earned it; thus, the couple could have a second stab at the lower
marginal tax rates. A simple example may best demonstrate such
consequences.
Consider a tax regime that has only two tax rates: ten percent on
the first $10,000 and fifty percent on any income above $10,000.3 ' Ta-
ble 1, below, demonstrates the tax consequences for each of four
hypothetical, unmarried individuals under such a regime.
TABLE I
INCOME AND TAXES BEFORE MARRIAGE





Now, consider the case in which Ann marries Bob and Catherine
marries David under a tax regime that treats husbands and wives as
separate taxpayers and where income splitting is not permitted. Table 2
summarizes the consequences.
39. I am indebted to Professor Martin D. Ginsburg for the example of the two-rate tax
system; Professor Ginsburg pays credit for such an example to Professor Boris Bittker.
See Martin D. Ginsburg, An Introduction to Issues of Income Taxation and the Family 6
n.
4 (2002) (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
40. $10,000 * 10% - $1,000.
41. ($10,000 * 10%) + ($10,000 "50%) = $1,000 + $5,000 = $6,000.
(Vol. 11:213220
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TABLE 2
INCOME AND TAXEs AFTER MARRIAGE
WITH No INCOME SPLITTING
Taxable Unit Income Tax Total Household
Tax
Ann $10,000 $1,000 $2,000
Bob $10,000 $1,000
Catherine $20,000 $6,000 $6,000
David $0 $0
As evident from Tables 1 and 2, in a regime that treats the husband
and wife as separate taxpayers, marriage has no consequence on total tax
liability.
However, consider the tax consequences of income splitting, which
allows a couple to add together their separate incomes, determine the
tax liability on half of that total income, and then multiply that tax li-
ability by two. Table 3 summarizes the effects of income splitting on the
two hypothetical couples.
TABLE 3
INCOME AND TAXES AFTER MARRIAGE WITH INCOME SPLITTING
Taxable Income Taxable Tax Total
Unit Income Household
Tax
Ann $10,000 $10,000 $1,000 $2,000
Bob $10,000 $10,000 $1,000
Catherine $20,000 $10,00042 $1,000 $2,000
David $0 $10,000 $1,000
Income splitting effectively distributes income equally between
husband and wife. Consequently, in one-wage-earner families, less of
the household's income is taxed at the progressively higher tax rates. For
example, Catherine and David are liable for taxes on only $10,000 each
at the ten percent marginal tax rate, rather than Catherine alone being
liable for taxes on $20,000-$ 10,000 of which would be taxed at the ten
42. ($20,000+$0)12 = $20,000/2 = $10,000.
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percent marginal tax rate while the other $10,000 would be taxed at the
fifty percent marginal tax rate. For families with two wage earners, the
benefits of income splitting are notably less significant, or absent. As the
example of Ann and Bob demonstrates, if a family has two wage earners
whose incomes are equal, income splitting proves inconsequential-the
total tax liability for the household remains the same.
C What is Community Property?
In order to understand the consequences to a married couple of
putting a community property regime in place, it is necessary to under-
stand, generally, what "community property" is.
Community property is a system of property ownership that gives a
husband and a wife equal ownership of property held in common. The
community property system conceives of the marriage as "a community
of which each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her
industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the
property after its dissolution."43 One of the leading scholars on commu-
nity property in the 1940s, William Quinby de Funiak, explained in his
treatise that the wife "is placed on a basis of equality with the husband
as to her ownership and rights in the community property. ,41
A community property system conceives of two types of property:
separate property not subject to community ownership and joint, or
"community," property. Separate property includes property acquired
during the marriage by gift, inheritance, or the like.45 In all of the eight
states that originally had community property regimes, the spouse who
received the separate property retained exclusive control over it; a hus-
band or wife could exclusively manage, control, or dispose of his or her
46
separate property. In contrast, the common law placed the manage-
ment and control of the wife's separate property in the hands of her
husband.
The Spanish ganancial community property system prevails in
many states. The ganancial system transforms only property "increased
43. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D, supra note 11, at 2-3.
44. COMMUNITY PROPERTY lsr, supra note 35, at 3. A similar view is expressed in the
second edition of this book: "Equality is the cardinal precept of the community prop-
erty system.... [T]he rubric itself is a shorthand rendition of the whole concept that
the husband and wife are equals." COMMUNITY PROPERTY 21, supra note 11, at 2-3.
45. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 1ST, supra note 35, at 318.
46. Seeid. at314-15.
47. Id. at 2.
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or multiplied during marriage" into community property"-that is, it
transforms into community property only that property acquired by
labor, while property obtained by gift, succession, or inheritance re-
mains a husband's or a wife's separate property. In addition, under the
Spanish system, the profits from a spouse's separate property are com-
munal property, regardless of whether the spouse acquired the property
before or after marriage." Some states follow the Spanish system, while
others provide by statute that the profits of a spouse's separate property
also remain the separate property of that spouse.' °
Of particular interest is the management and control of the com-
munity property. The law treated the community of the husband and
wife as a partnership, with the husband acting as the managing part-
ner. Consequently, the husband customarily had a duty to administer
the community property.52 The husband could dispose of the property
without the consent of or conveyance by his wife," and this disposition
would be valid unless it defrauded or injured the wife.54 The husband's
right to manage, control, and dispose of the marital community prop-
erty, however, could only be exercised for the preservation or benefit of
the community." The husband "could not dispose of it for his own ex-
clusive benefit, dispose of it for inadequate consideration, or otherwise
deal with it in a manner indicative by its very nature of an express or
implied intent to prejudice the rights of the wife."56 If the husband ne-
glected his duties, the wife was able to obtain remedial relief.57 Thus, not
only did the operation of a community property regime divert property
from a husband to his wife, but it also provided recourse to the wife in
the case of mismanagement. Nonetheless, the male legislatures in five
states enacted community property statutes between 1939 and 1947.
48. Id. at 2 n.4.
49. Id. at 180.
50. Id. at 181-82.
51. Id. at 263-66.
52. Id. at 262, 322. De Funiak offered his own explanation of why: "This has resulted
from the consideration of the husband as the head of the family, as the one who due
to economic and biological factors has been the member of the marital partnership
more practiced and experienced in the acquisition and management of property." Id.
at 322 (emphasis added).
53. In some states, however, the husband and wife were required jointly to execute and to
acknowledge any instrument to convey, transfer, or encumber property. See id at
324-25.
54. Id. at 262.
55. Id. at 323.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 326.
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If. PASSAGE OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAWS IN THE STATES
Earl and Seaborn made clear that the recently imposed federal in-
come tax might be avoided by novel legal maneuvers. Married couples
consequently engaged in various transactions in an effort to reduce the
household's income tax liability. Some husbands gave gifts of income-
producing property to their wives, while others established trusts for
their wives or created partnerships "in which the wife was said to have
invested time and energy in lieu of money."58 While married couples
attempted to reduce their income tax liability through private action,
state legislators attempted to reduce their constituents' federal income
tax liability through state action by proposing and enacting community
property laws.
A. Five States Take Action
In 1939, Oklahoma became the first of the common law states to
enact laws creating a community property regime.59 Oklahoma's com-
munity property statute provided that the law only applied to those
married couples that elected to come under the terms of the Act.60 In
1943, Oregon followed Oklahoma's lead and enacted its own commu-
nity property statute,6' which similarly required that married couples
elect to have the law treat their separate property as community prop-
62
erty. The following year, however, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Harmon, the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma's statute did not
effectively create a community property system.63 Because Oklahoma's
statute did not automatically transform married couples' property into
community property, it did not create community property between a
husband and a wife as an incident of matrimony6 Thus, Oklahoma did
58. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note t, at 175. It is estimated that the number ofpartnership
returns filed by married couples reached 244,670 in 1930, declined during the de-
pression, but increased steadily after 1937. Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and
Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIsT. REV. 259,
303 n.118 (1988).
59. See Act of May 10, 1939, supra note 8.
60. Id. § 51.
61. See Act of Mar. 29, 1943, supra note 9.
62. Id.§1.
63. 323 U.S. 44, 47-49 (1944).
64. Harmon, 323 U.S. at 47-48.
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not create a system "dictated by State policy,"65 whereas the traditional
community property system in states such as Washington, where the
Seaborns lived, presumably reflected state policy and thus required def-
erence by the Court. As the Court explained, "The most that can be said
is that the present policy of Oklahoma is to permit spouses, by contract,
to alter the status which they would otherwise have under the prevailing
property system in the State., 66 In other words, the statute provided for
the same private ordering that the Court invalidated in Earl. Because
Oregon's community property law also provided for private contracting
similar to that struck down in Earl, Harmon effectively invalidated Ore-
gon's community property law, as well.
This, however, did not discourage Oklahoma. During the next leg-
islative session, in 1945, Oklahoma repealed the 1939 Act at issue in
Harmon and enacted a new law that created community property be-
tween husband and wife as an incident to marriage, thus curing the
1939 Act's deficiencies.67 Oregon, however, lacked Oklahoma's confi-
dence. It, too, prompdy repealed its community property law during its
1945 legislative session,68 but Oregon waited until April 19, 1947 to
enact a law that effected community property as an incident of mar-
69
riage.
The legislators of Michigan, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania concur-
rently were considering enacting community property laws in their own
states. In June of 1947, Nebraska enacted a community property stat-
ute; on July 1, 1947, Michigan enacted its own law; and just days later,
on July 7, 1947, Pennsylvania approved a similar law.75
65. Harmon, 323 U.S. at 48.
66. Harmon, 323 U.S. at 47. It is interesting to note that existing community property
regimes had historically allowed for married couples to contract out of the commu-
nity property system before marriage. COMMUNITY PROPERTY IST, supra note 35, at
265.
67. Act of May 5, 1945, ch. 1, 1945 Okla. Sess. Laws 121 (repealing 1939 Act); Id.
55 1-15, 17-18 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. 5 66-82 (1945)) (enacting new
community property legislation) (repealed 1949).
68. Act of Mar. 20, 1945, ch. 270, 1945 Or. Laws 409.
69. Act of Apr. 19, 1947, see supra note 9.
70. See supra notes 6, 7, and 10. The legislative history of the enactment of the Pennsyl-
vania community property law and the subsequent ruling of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court that the law was unconstitutional are discussed infra Part III.C.
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B. Congress Takes Action
While the legislators of Oregon, Michigan, Nebraska, and Pennsyl-
vania were considering community property laws in their states,
Congress was relentlessly considering various tax reduction bills at the
federal level. In January of 1947, the 80th Congress introduced House
Bill 1, which provided for a reduction in income tax rates.' President
Truman vetoed the bill, and supporters of the bill could not mobilize
the two-thirds majority necessary to override the President's veto. 2 Less
than six months later, Congress attempted to pass House Bill 3950,73 a
tax reduction bill that was almost identical to House Bill 1; the only
difference was that it would take effect in January of 1948, rather than
in January of 1947.74 Again, Truman vetoed the tax reduction measure,
and again the veto was sustained." In 1948, Congress, during its second
session, put forth a third attempt to enact a tax reduction bill, House
Bill 4790,76 and for a third time, the President vetoed the bill. Deter-
mined to pass a tax reduction bill-and not discouraged by what
seemed to be the bill's "ill-omened star" 7-the Congress mustered the
two-thirds majority and overrode Truman's veto.78 An article in The
New York Times reported, "Both houses overrode Mr. Truman's veto
less than four hours after its receipt and with many votes to spare ....
[T]he House overrode the veto without a word of debate, and the Sen-
ate followed suit after a brief discussion. 79
House Bill 4790, like its predecessors, reduced the "extremely high
rates of the individual income tax.""' But it did more than merely reduce
tax rates. It also introduced what is now known as the "married, filing
jointly" tax return-married couples could elect to file a joint return, '
71. H.R 1, 80th Cong. (1947).
72. MAURICE ALFxANDRE ET AL., PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, MARITAL DEDUCTIONS,
SPLIT INCOME AND THE REVENUE ACT OF 1948: THE TREASURY REGULATIONS 1(1948); see also Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of
1948, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1097 n.2 (1948).
73. H.R. 3950, 80th Cong. (1947).
74. ALEXANDRE ET AL., supra note 72, at 1.
75. Id.
76. H.R_ 4790, 80th Cong. (1948).
77. Surrey, supra note 72, at 1097.
78. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 114 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
79. John D. Morris, The Tax Reduction Bill Becomes Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1948, ar
1.
80. H.R REP. No. 80-1274 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1258, 1258.81. I.R.C. § 51(b)(1) (1949).
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and, if they did, income tax liability would be calculated by determining
the tax liability on half the income and multiplying the tax liability by
two.
82 The married filing jointly tax return effectively made community
property law regimes inconsequential to a taxpayer's tax liability.83
C. 4 Repealed, 1 Held Unconstitutional
In less than a year after the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1948,
Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon repealed their community
property statutes.84 Michigan led the way, repealing its community prop-
erty law within just a few months of the enactment of the Revenue Act of
1948. The other states quickly followed, taking action during their next
legislative sessions in 1949. The legislatures in Nebraska, Oklahoma, and
Oregon introduced bills repealing the community property laws just days
apart in January of 1949. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court had already de-
clared Pennsylvania's statute unconstitutional in 1947.5 Not only did
Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon take quick action to repeal
their community property laws, but none of the five states seemed inter-
ested in enacting similar legislation.86
III. WAS "MORE THAN MONEY" INVOLVED?
The quick repeal of the community property laws in Michigan,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon following the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1948 suggests that the passage of the community prop-
erty laws in these states, as well as in Pennsylvania, simply served as a
tax-saving measure. The foreword address by William A. Sutherland,
the Chairman of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA), to an ABA report explained that the Revenue Act of 1948
"accomplishes substantially complete equalization of taxes as between
community property and common-law states without the necessity of
82. I.R.C. § 12(d) (1949).
83. See supra Part I.B.
84. See supra notes 6-9.
85. Nelson, supra note 10, at F1.
86. The legislative journals of the five states indicate that none of them considered enact-
ing community property laws in the years immediately following the repeal of such
laws.
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changing the fundamental law in either. 8 7 The ABA had an active role
in the passage of the Revenue Act of 1948, and Sutherland played a par-
ticularly instrumental role in the bill's passage." Thus, Sutherland was
in a position to know, or at the least in a position to recommend, why
House Bill 4790 should pass: to reduce taxes while neutralizing the con-
sequences of a community property regime on a taxpayer's tax liability.
A House report from the Committee on Ways and Means, which
recommended passage of House Bill 4790, similarly implied that vari-
ous community property laws were passed to achieve tax savings. The
report explained that "[e]qualization is provided for the tax burdens of
married couples in common-law and community-property States" by
operation of the bill.89
Little can be learned from the legislative journals of Michigan, Ne-
braska, Oklahoma, and Oregon. Although the relevant legislative
journals for these states chronicle the respective legislature's actions, for
the most part, they do not report or preserve debates, discussions, or
oral statements, either on the floor or in committee meetings. What
these chronicles do indicate is that many bills were referred to the
Committee on Taxation, or the equivalent, of the relevant legislative
body, which suggests that some of the legislators were aware that adopt-
ing a community property regime would effect tax consequences.
Unlike the journals of its sister states, the Pennsylvania legislative
journals do chronicle the debates over the proposed community prop-
erty regime. An examination of those debates in tandem with a
consideration of the social context in which they occurred suggests that
the community property laws were adopted for more than the tax bene-
fits that accrued to the states' citizens.
In July of 1947, Governor Duff of Pennsylvania signed the Com-
munity Property Act of 1947 ("Act") into law. 90 The legislation
provided, in part, that "[a]ll property acquired by either the husband or
wife during marriage ..., except that which is the separate property of
87. William A. Sutherland, Foreword Supplemental Report of Committee on Equalization
of Taxes in Community-Property and Common-Law States and Resolutions ofthe Asso-
ciation Containing the Draft ofa Bill to Equalize Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes
as Between Community-Property and Common-Law States, 1947 A.B.A. SEC. TAxA-
TION.
88. An article in The New York Times reported, "the members of the Section of Taxation
of the American Bar Association, who through its chairman, William A. Southerland
[sic], contributed substantially to the draftsmanship of the bill." Godfrey N. Nelson,
Taxation Reform Is Seen Under Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1948, at F1.
89. H.R. REP. No. 80-1274 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1258, 1258; see also
S. REP. No. 80-1013 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163,1163.
90. See Act of July 7, 1947, supra note 10.
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either, . . shall be deemed the community or common property of the
husband and wife, and each shall be vested with an undivided one-half
interest therein."" The enactment defined "separate property" as all real
and personal property of the husband and wife, "owned or claimed ...
before marriage ... and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise or de-
scent, or received as compensation for personal injuries.
" 92 In addition,
section four of the Act provided that the husband and wife each shall
have the management and control of his or her separate property, and
the wife shall have management and control over "that portion of the
common or community property, consisting of her earnings, all rents,
interest, dividends and other income from her separate property and all
other common or community property, the title to which stands in her
name."" In addition to the management and control over his separate
property, the Act provided that the husband shall have management 
and
control over all community property "which is not conferred upon the
wife.
' 94
A. Women and Work: Would Community Property
Laws Really Save Money?
Significant debate preceded the passage of the Pennsylvania Com-
munity Property Act. In a statement issued by Governor Duff
accompanying his approval of the Act, he commented that it was "one
of the most discussed bills before the General Assembly," and he noted
that he had received a substantial number of letters regarding the 
pro-
posed Act." Debates in the House and Senate were primarily concerned
with two issues: the Act's tax consequences at both the state and federal
level, and the effect of a community property regime on the property
rights of husbands.
The bill's potential tax benefits motivated its introduction in the
Pennsylvania Senate. Nationally, there was a press for tax cuts.
Republican members of Congress were ever introducing legislation to
achieve federal tax cuts, only to time and time again meet President
Truman's veto. Whether federal tax cuts would ever be achieved was





95. Community Property Bill Becomes State Law: Governor Hopes It Will 
Induce Congress to
Draft New Act, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, PA), July 9, 1947, at 1.
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significant. Oklahoma had already enacted legislation creating a
community property regime to achieve income splitting and to reduce
federal taxes, and Oregon had passed similar legislation that would soon
become effective. This brought the number of community property
states to ten. Was it fair that the residents of ten states would receive
preferential federal tax treatment while the other thirty-eight states
would not?
Proponents of the Community Property Act argued that if tax re-
lief could not be achieved at the federal level, then surely it could be
achieved at the state level. Future tax savings to the residents of the nine
states that already had effective community property laws were esti-
mated to be about $200,000,000; 96 if Pennsylvania enacted the
Community Property Act, its residents would potentially save more
than $100,000,000 in taxes. 7 Proponents argued that Pennsylvanians
surely believed they had a right to the preferential tax treatment that
residents of community property states received. The sponsor of the bill
in the Pennsylvania Senate, Mr. Lord, flatly pronounced during a Sen-
ate debate, "I do not see why any member of this Senate wants to
discriminate in favor of the citizens of California, Arizona, Texas, Lou-
isiana, New Mexico, Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Oklahoma, and, on
July 5, 1947, Oregon."" Members of the Pennsylvania House similarly
expressed that Pennsylvania "should be put on a par with other states. "99
Opponents of the Act, however, thought the tax benefits of the Act
were illusory. Specifically, they argued that federal tax savings in the pre-
sent would lead to increased federal taxes later, and if increasingly more
states adopted community property laws, the consequences to the fed-
eral treasury would necessitate additional tax measures to make up the
difference."' In addition, the tax benefits did not accrue equally to all
Pennsylvanians; individuals in higher income brackets were the primary
beneficiaries of the Act's tax savings.'0° Mr. Capano, a House member
and colorful opponent of the Act, noted, "Senate Bill No. 615 is de-
signed to permit a very select class of Pennsylvania citizens to defraud
96. Although the Oklahoma legislature had passed a similar community property law, it
had not yet taken effect, and thus the tax savings of the Oklahoma law are not in-
cluded in this estimate.
97. S. 137, 63rd Sess., at 3229 (Pa. 1947).
98. Id at 3227.
99. See H. 137, 77th Sess., at 5569 (Pa. 1947).
100. Mr. Capano, a member of the House, noted, "if this practice is widespread it would
naturally result in the Federal Government budget being unbalanced and additional
taxes would be levied in order to make up the shortage." Id. at 5565.
101. Of course, this is the natural consequence of a progressive tax schedule.
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The tax savings, however, were illusory in yet a third way that went
unrecognized by both the supporters and the opponents of the bill.
Much of the debate assumed that the average household contained only
one wage earner.' In fact, during the 1940s, many married women
worked.
1. Married Women Go to Work
The United States' entry into World War I, following Japan's
bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, created such a critical
labor shortage that women found themselves in great demand for high-
paying jobs. °I The number of women workers rose from more than
fourteen and a half million in 1941 to more than nineteen million in
1945.105 The proportion of employed women sixteen years of age and
older rose from 27.9 percent in 1940 to 35.8 percent in 1945.°FMany
women exited the labor force when the men returned from the war,
which resulted in a decrease in the number of women workers in
1946.07 By 1947, however, when four states adopted community prop-
erty regimes, women were re-entering the workforce, "as the long-term
trend in female employment reasserted itself.""08 The war accelerated the
trend of women's increasing presence in the labor force, but "it did not
produce it. "'0 9
The government provided the greatest support for women's entry
into the workforce. For example, Secretary of War Henry Stimson is-
sued a pamphlet entitled, "You're Going to Employ Women,""
0 and
distributed it to employers. The war effort needed women's labor, which
contributed significantly to the production of "tanks, airplane frames,
102. H. 137-77, 77th Sess., at 5569 (emphasis added).
103. For example, Mr. Capano believed that a community property regime created the
fictional belief that both husband and wife participated in the production of income.
Id.
104. ROSALIND ROSENBERG, DIVIDED LIVES, AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 126 (1992).
105. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 Series D 29-41 (Bicentennial Ed. 1975).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.; SUSAN M. HARTMANN, AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE 1940s, THE HOME FRONT
AND BEYOND 24 (1982).
109. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 130.
110. Id. at 128.
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engines, propellers, parachutes, ships, gas masks, life rafts, ammunition,
artillery, and electrical equipment.... The government urged women to
take up the helm in factory work and contribute to the war effort with
posters of Rosie the Riveter. Rosie became a symbol of what the Ameri-
can woman could be-a patriotic, hard working wage earner. A popular
song of the day celebrated "Rosies," as women working in war manufac-
turing became known:
All the day long
whether rain or shine,




Keeps a sharp lookout for sabotage,
Sitting up there on the fuselage.
That little frail can do
More than a male can do,
Rosie the riveter.
Rosie's got a boyfriend, Charlie,
Charlie, he's a marine
Rosie, is protecting Charlie
Working overtime on the riveting machine.
When they gave her a production "E"
She was as proud as a girl could be,
There's something true about
Red, white, and blue about
Rosie the riveter."2
Most of the women who entered the workforce during this period
were married. The biggest increase in the proportion of women em-
ployed occurred between 1942 and 1943."' Fortune magazine reported
that by 1943, "'practically no unmarried women [were] left to draw
on.' 114 After 1943, the increase in the work force came primarily from
housewives."' From 1940 to 1944, the percentage of married women in
the workforce rose from 36.4 percent to 45.7 percent, while the per-
centage of single women in the workforce dropped from 48.5 percent to
111. Id. at 127.
112. REDD EVANS & JOHN JACOB LOEB, ROSIE THE RrVETER (Paramount Music Corp.
1942).
113. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 105.
114. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 130.
115. Id.
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40.9 percent."' "For the first time in U.S. history married women out-
numbered single women in the labor force, and women over thirty-five,
once considered unemployable, outnumbered their younger sisters.
' 17
Because many married World War II women worked after a community
property regime was less likely to produce significant, beneficial tax con-
sequences.
2. Women as Significant Wage Earners
Of course, if women's wages were significantly below men's, then
the effects of a community property regime might still be substantial.
But because of the scarcity of labor during the war, women's wages ac-
tually increased significantly, both absolutely and relative to men s.8
"The median income for all women, adjust[ed] for inflation, rose 38
percent during the war .... 119
The biggest increase in women's wages occurred in war manufac-
turing,' 20 and women's work-force participation in defense work grew by
460 percent. 12' Factory work, generally, claimed two and a half million
new women workers. 2 2 Women also took jobs in other fields tradition-
ally occupied by men and which had historically higher wages.121
Women took jobs as taxicab drivers, bus drivers, railroad workers, lum-
berjacks, security guards, welders, and riveters.124 Women also made
gains in professional careers, albeit the gains were modest because of the
extensive training required. The war created career opportunities for
women in medicine, scientific research, aviation, academia, journalism,
music, professional athletics, and the like, as men left for the war.' 25 In-
deed, women's employment rose in every field except domestic
services. 126 Even women who worked in industries that had traditionally
employed women experienced an increase in wages.
127
The boost in women's wages received significant support from the
government. The War Manpower Commission encouraged employers
116. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 105, at Series D 49-62.
117. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 130.
118. Id. at 127; HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 21.
119. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 127-28.
120. HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 21.
121. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 127.
122. Id. at 127.
123. See HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 21.
124. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 127.
125. Id.; HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 21.
126. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 127.
127. HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 21.
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to adopt uniform wages for men and women, and the National War
Labor Board, in 1942, ruled that Brown and Sharp, a manufacturing
company, could not pay women twenty percent less than men for the
same work.12 In addition, the army began enlisting women, enticing
them with pay equal to the pay of men of the same rank.12 Women's
wages were similarly boosted by state lawmakers, as four state legisla-
tures enacted equal pay laws during the war."'
One state, Oklahoma, enacted its community property laws during
the wartime years when women's wages were rising. By 1947, when
Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, and Pennsylvania enacted their commu-
nity property laws, women's wages had begun to decrease as the return
of American men alleviated the labor shortage and employers reverted to
their pre-war attitudes about employing women. " ' Nonetheless, a small
number of women maintained the improvements they achieved during
the war.'32 Consequently, the benefits of a community property regime
were likely more modest than the legislatures of Pennsylvania, Michi-
gan, Nebraska, and Oregon acknowledged. Any tax benefits expected
for the residents of Oklahoma certainly were modest, as its community
property regime took effect when women's workforce participation and
wages were peaking.
3. Chasing Butterflies...
Nonetheless, a popular belief remained that married women did
not work. In 1948, George Lawton, a commentator writing in The New
York Times, urged married women to go to work. 33 In an article, enti-
tled, "Proof That She Is the Stronger Sex: The 'little woman' resists
overwork, budgets her energy, lives longer-and creates a new prob-
lem," Lawton, a gerontologist and psychologist, explained that women
128. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 129.
129. Id. at 126.
130. HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 22.
131. See ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 134-35. Rosenberg explains that a Women's
Bureau survey in the fall of 1946 found that forty-five percent of women working in
aircraft, shipbuilding, and electrical equipment had been able to keep their wartime
jobs. Id. at 134. "Nine out of ten of those who remained, nevertheless, experienced a
decrease in pay, from roughly $50 a week to $37 a week." Id. at 134-35.
132. Id. at 135.
133. See George Lawton, Proof That She Is the Stronger Sex: The 'little woman' resists over-
work, budgets her energy, lives longer-and creates a newproblem, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1948 (Magazine), at 7.
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lived longer because they are the stronger sex."' He explained that a
woman maintains her strength because she "releases her energy much
more evenly and quietly""'35-that is, because she does not work as hard
as men. Lawton recounts an observation made by Thomas Sugrue in his
autobiography that it takes only a little over a year to convert a luxury
into a necessity.' 36 Lawton must have had modern conveniences like dish
and clothing washers in mind, because he concludes,
[T]he result is that the American woman does less and less,
lives longer and longer, while her husband, a drone, "a social
eunuch," his insurance paid up, dies of a heart attack before
he's 50.
From my experience I should say that the American male
of the middle-income brackets overworks himself and that his
wife underworks herself. As a leading woman's magazine puts
it, "Of all the labor-saving devices ever invented for women,
none has ever been so popular as a devoted male."
Our men die earlier probably because it is they who face
most of the strain of earning a living, the high pressure and the
competition. It might be that we could get men to live as long
or longer than the female by making woman [sic] the wage-
earner.
In that case the man would remain at home and take care
of the house and the children. Many men and women would
find this a charming idea, but only a small number of men
could endure this role. It would cripple the male animal, built
for the display of energy.'
Lawton's solution to this disparity in longevity and the boredom
that accompanies women, probably widowed, into their older age was
"[flor them to go to work, either in business or at home."' 38 As Lawton
saw it, the most common pursuit of working-age women was not work,
134. Lawton, with tongue in cheek, even concedes that women are physically stronger
than men: "My Steinway is too much for me to budge, but let my maid, Alice, heave
and my piano slowly ascends." Id. Yet, he daims " [w]omen are inferior to men in
creative imagination." Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 67.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 68.
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but rather pursuing an available man, only to catch him and hope that
he died like a housefly the next day. A cartoon accompanying Lawton's
article depicted full-figured women with large butterfly nets in hand
chasing after drones with human, male heads. The author characterized
his proffered advice as an effort "to help the older woman with her
problems" of boredom and loneliness resulting from outliving her hus-
band.
Lawton was not alone in his belief that women's workforce and
domestic contributions paled in comparison to men's contributions.
Many of the Pennsylvania legislators similarly assumed that most mar-
ried women did not work in wage-earning jobs, nor did they earn their
"fair share" by performing domestic work at home. For example, the
Pennsylvania Community Property Act's anti-champion, Mr. Capano,
noted, "In order to work this fraud it is necessary that the present laws
relating to the rights of husband and wife be changed. That a fiction be
created whereby all property be considered as property common and both
participate in the production of the income."'39 Mr. Capano believed the
Act created a false conception that wives contributed to the production
of income and to the marital community.
1 40
Even supporters of the Pennsylvania Community Property Act op-
erated under the assumption that most married women did not work in
wage-earning jobs. The supporters of the Act justified the law by argu-
ing that there would be significant tax savings for all families at the
lowest income level."' This claim is accurate only if income splitting
results in a significant diversion of income from a wage-earning spouse
to a non-wage-earning spouse.
139. H. 137, 77th Sess., at 5569 (emphasis added).
140. Mr. Capano's remarks echo comments made more than a decade before. In 1933, the
Treasury urged Congress to pass a law taxing married couples on their joint income
without any change in the tax schedule. The Treasury's proposal reacted to the many
legal maneuvers employed by married couples to reduce their tax liability. The Treas-
ury took the position that the family, rather than the individual, was the taxable unit.
Many took the view that any other view of the family
was a mere subterfuge for tax evasion. Representative David Lewis of
Maryland, reporting to the House Ways and Means Committee... caught
the spirit of the attack. The 'legal fiction' set up in the community prop-
erty states, he proclaimed, 'that the income of the husband is one half the
income of the wife should not be allowed to defeat the Federal income tax
law and discriminate against citizens in the other 40 states.'
KESSLER-HARmS, supra note tj at 178-79.
141. H. 137, 77th Sess., at 5569.
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B. Femme Fatale: Husbands Beware of Your Wives
But why? What led so many well educated men 4 2 to believe incor-
rectly that most married women were not working? Perhaps they were
led to believe women were not working and significantly contributing to
the household's income because that is what they hoped to achieve. In
many ways, the post-World-War-II attitudes mimicked those of the late
1920s and 1930s during the Depression. After the stock market crashed
in 1929, working women suffered a vicious backlash.' 43 "Efforts to un-
derstand the causes of the Depression led many to blame women,
especially married women, for having taken men's jobs."1 44 Federal and
state legislatures enacted laws that effectively prohibited married women
from working in many jobs. 4' A 1936 Gallup poll asking whether mar-
ried women should work if their husbands were employed reported that
eighty-two percent of all respondents, and seventy-five percent of all
women respondents, answered no. 1' 6 "Many men held to this view even
in the face of their own unemployment. One jobless, working class hus-
band declared that 'the women's place is in the home. I would rather
starve than let my wife work.' ,,"17 Nonetheless, women's participation in
the labor force reached an all-time high during the Depression. Al-
though industries in which men predominantly worked contracted
during the Depression, the service and clerical sector, which employed
significant numbers of women, expanded.
48
Many were similarly reluctant to accept women into the workforce
during World War II. Employers and government officials only slowly
realized the need for, and the potential of, women's labor.14 9 Entities
such as the War Department "took the position that defense producers
should not be encouraged to utilize women on a large scale until all
142. For example, many of the Pennsylvania legislators were lawyers, and Lawton was a
gerontologist and psychologist.
143. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 102.
144. Id. at 102-03.
145. Id. at 103. At the federal level, "Congress passed Section 213 of the Federal Economy
Act, which prohibited more than one family member from working in the federal
civil service." Id. Efforts to keep married women from working were even more pro-
nounced at the state level. "In half the states, bills were proposed to prohibit the
hiring of married women in any job." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 105.
149. HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 53-54.
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available male labor in the area has first been employed."' 5 ° Husbands
expressed similar attitudes. A 1943 Gallup poll reported that only thirty
percent of men were willing to have their wives take a full-time job run-
ning a machine in a war plant. 5'
Even after women took to the workforce in large numbers during
the 194 0s, many believed that it was a "regrettable necessity" that would
only have to be endured "for the duration" of the war.15 2 This belief was
consistent with legislative action in Congress and policies adopted by
trade unions. The Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, which
established a draft for male citizens, also provided an employment resto-
ration program; the Act ensured enlisted men that the jobs they had
before leaving for the war would be available to them upon their re-
turn.'53 In addition, although unions, such as the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) and the United Electrical Workers (UEW), played
an instrumental role in easing the transition of women into the work-
force,' 5 4 they were also instrumental in guaranteeing that women would
exit the workforce after the war. "To ensure that women would not stay
past the end of the war, union contracts granted seniority equal to the
time spent in military service both to veterans previously employed by a
unionized company and to those newly hired after discharge from the
military."155
Nonetheless, many women wanted to remain employed. Seventy-
five percent of women hoped to continue working after the war, al-
though not necessarily in the same jobs.'56 The war had allowed many
women to achieve some level of economic independence. In addition,
wartime propaganda infused women's work with patriotism, which en-
hanced "the importance of women as citizens."'15 7 Giving up work meant
giving up more than high wages. It meant giving up independence and a
respected role in society. One woman, an electrician's helper working in
a navy yard who came out of the war a widow, flatly confessed, "I like
my work so much that they'll have to fire me before I leave."158
150. Id. at 54 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
151. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 131.
152. Id. at 134; HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 23.
153. See Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 783, § 8, 54 Stat. 885
(1940); Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.L Jane?: Citizenship, Gender, and
Social Policy in the Postwar Era, 9 MicH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 103-04, 119 (2002).
154. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 133.
155. Id. at 134.
156. Id.
157. HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 21.
158. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 134.
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The "marked loosening of sexual mores"' during the war did not
help women's cause in the labor market. Many single teenage girls,
known as "Victory girls," had sex with service men before they shipped
off as a gesture of patriotism."9 Married women were not immune from
the lax sexual mores. "[M]arital infidelity soared, as young wives, sepa-
rated by war from their husbands, had affairs with other men.' 16 1 Some
Americans felt that something had to be done to contain married
women.
A not-so-subtle change in attitude toward working, married
women, reminiscent of the attitudes during the Depression, resulted.
Working, married women became the enemy to men's economic vital-
ity, the institution of marriage, and the country's safety. These women
not only competed with their husbands in the labor market, but they
also caused harm to the country. In the post-war years, the fear of
Communism was widespread, and the suburban home and family was
the American citizen's weapon in the Cold War. While the Levitt
brothers made owning the suburban home possible for many Ameri-
cans, 62 wives had to ensure the family's security by fulfilling the role of
good mothers. And, according to psychiatrists, sociologists, and other
contemporary family experts, a good mother maintained limited par-
ticipation in society.'63 For example, Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia
Farnham, in their 1947 best seller, Modern Woman: The Lost Sex, urged
women to accept graciously their subordination to their husbands and
the joys of motherhood."6 Educated and working women, they warned,
would lead to the "masculinization of women with enormously danger-
ous consequences to the home, the children dependent on it, and the
159. Id. at 128.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 141-42. y applying methods of mass production to home building, the Levitt
brothers were able to cut costs and undersell their competitors by $1,500 per house,
thus giving birth to an entire town: Levittown, New York. Levitt homes were small,
but the home only covered fifteen percent of the property lot, allowing do-it-yourself
expansion. One of the Levitt brothers, William Levitt, thought of his homes as con-
tributing to American ideals: "No man who owns his house and lot can be a
Communist. He has too much to do." Id. at 142. Rosenberg notes that Betty Friedan
remembered, "'Security' was the big part of the family's attraction." Id. at 148. One
commentator observed, "Youngsters want to grasp what little security they can in a
world gone frightening insecure. The youngsters feel they will cultivate the one secu-
rity that's possible-their own gardens, their own.., home and families." Id.
163. Id. at 153.
164. Id. at 153-54.
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ability of the woman, as well as her husband, to obtain sexual gratifica-
tio n .
',65
Nowhere was the view of "women as enemy" more evident than on
the silver screen. Many films during the 1940s criticized working
women. One scholar argues that many women depicted in films of the
1940s suffered fates that "suggested the incompatibility of professional
success with marriage.0 66 Thefilm noir genre especially depicted women
negatively. Noir films of the 1940s prominently featured the femme fa-
tale-the seductively attractive woman who leads men into danger. For
example, in Double Indemnity (1944), the leading lady, beautiful Bar-
bara Stanwyck, convinces her lover, insurance agent Fred MacMurray,
to kill her husband. 6 7 Not only does Stanwyck undermine MacMurray's
comfortable life as an insurance agent, but she also undermines any idea
that the "very pretty little house on a very pretty little plot" in which she
and her husband live is a secure place.' Although noir films vary wildly
in their plot, "[t]he undercurrent that flows through most 'high noir'
films is the failure on the part of the male leads to recognize the dishon-
esty inherent in many of noir's principal women."' 6 This flaw ruins the
leading male characters in many noir films, including Laura (1944),
Women in the Window (1944), Scarlet Street (1945), and The Locket
(1947).170
The attitude cast on the silver screen was reflected on the floor of
the Pennsylvania legislature during the debates over the Community
Property Act. Opponents of the law characterized a community prop-
erty system as committing a "fraud" against the federal government by
allowing Pennsylvania residents to "cheat" on their taxes. 7' These emo-
tionally charged remarks hinted at the opponents' concerns about the
165. Id. at 154 (quoting FERDINAND LUNDBERG & MARYNtA FARNHARM, MODERN
WOMAN: THE LOST SEx (1947)).
166. HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 201. A few of the movies that portrayed working
women negatively include Together Again (1944), Spellbound (1945), and Mildred
Pierce (1945). Id. Two movies that depicted working women positively-Woman of
the Year (1941) and Adam's Rib (194 9)-"were exceptional" for their positive depic-
tion of successful, professional women. Id.
167. Id. at 202.
168. See Warren Susman, Did Success Spoil the United States? Dual Representations in Post-
war America, in RECASTING AMERICA 19, 29 (Lary May ed., 1989).
169. Michael Mills, High Heels on Wet Pavement: Film Noir and the Femme Fatale, Mod-
erntimes Classic Film Pages, at http://www.moderntimes.com/palace/filmnoir/
index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
170. Id.
171. See H. 137, 77th Sess., at 5565 (Pa. 1947). Mr. Capano bemoaned, "[w]e passed a
law a few days ago to close the door to the penny chislers on the cigarette tax and we
now propose to open the doors to those who cheat in thousands of dollars." Id.
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negative effects of the Act on husbands. Mr. Capano understood the
Community Property Act to create a very real threat to husbands, em-
bodied in their wives:
The wife or husband, as the case may be, can legally claim
one-half of the real estate, money in the bank or other assets,
regardless of the name thereon; one-half of the income, regard-
less who earns it; in the event of divorce, the wife will be
entitled to one-half of all property; in cases of separation, the
wife could legally claim one-half of the income and go into
Court to have her husband support her from the other half of
172his half of the income....
Other legislators shared Mr. Capano's concerns:
Mr. STONIER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to have the gentle-
man from Elk [Mr. Sorg] answer this question, say that a man
marries a lady or a girl and she has a judgment against her, is
the husband responsible for her judgment?
Mr. SORG. He is not, Mr. Speaker.
17 3
Although the law, on its face, could effect redistribution of prop-
erty rights to the husband and the wife, those objecting to the act
primarily were concerned with the Act's effects on the husband's prop-
erty:
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I understand that this act has
two salient features. I just want to be sure that one does not
acquire any financial advantage under this act by marrying a
rich widow.
Mr. SORG. Not if she is rich when he marries her, Mr.
Speaker. It is only what he acquires afterward.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, the gold digger who marries a
wealthy bachelor, does she stand to profit under this act?
Mr. SORG. Mr. Speaker, I am amazed that the gentleman
would suggest that a widow marry a bachelor.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 5569.
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Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I should say a sugar daddy[ ]-
a gold digger marries a sugar daddy. Does she profit under this
act?
Mr. SORG. This act applies only to property acquired after
the marriage, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, am I privileged under this act
to share equally in the earnings of my wife[?]
Mr. SORG. The gentleman is, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, that is one good feature of this
act.
Getting back to the fundamental economic situation, the
women of the Commonwealth have command of a budget of
expenditures at the present time exceeding ninety million dol-
lars. That is what they are spending every year. Eighty per cent
of the insurance policies in force are made out for women.
Practically every man that takes out insurance names a woman
as his beneficiary.... Ninety per cent of all women that write
insurance policies name a woman as beneficiary, and thirty of
our major corporations in this country by their stock owner-
ship could be controlled by women if they personally and
individually voted their stock interests, so that if under this bill
one shares in the earnings of one's wife, that is one virtue. I
wish that the Majority Leader had explained more clearly what
happens in the case of divorce, if he would clear up my mind
on what happens under this bill in the case of divorce.'74
Although Mr. Andrews understood the act to effect redistribution
to the husband-"one good feature"-he seems at least equally aware
that the act distributed property away from the husband, especially in
the case of divorce. Other legislators expressed similar concerns regard-
ing the distribution of property rights at the death of the husband to the
wife, and away from the children.
175
Even the beliefs of those who supported community property laws
were not inconsistent with the idea that working, married women posed
174. Id. at 5566.
175. See S. 137, 63rd Sess., at 3226 (Pa. 1947); H. 137, 77th Sess., at 5563-71 passim
(Pa. 1947).
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a threat to their husbands and the country. Some of the supporters of
community property regimes argued in favor of the laws by maintaining
that wives' contributions at home were worth part of their husbands'
salaries. For example, the sponsor and biggest supporter of the commu-
nity property laws in Pennsylvania, Senator Mr. Lord, explained,
Just last Saturday in the Saturday Evening Post there ap-
peared an article, a copy of which I hold in my hand. The
matter deserves such attention that they have carried this arti-
cle entitled, "How nine states beat the income tax" and this
article says "simply because they live in lucky states-and are
good to their wives-thousands of favored citizens get a sweet
reduction in the income tax.
... A man's income, where should it go? It should go to his
wife and his family.... [W]e all feel that [the act] will have
the effect of keeping families together, by distributing the in-
come between husband and wife, where it belongs, and in
addition to that every five years-realize this, Mr. President,
under this bill every five years every citizen of Pennsylvania
will get a sabbatical leave from the payment of federal income
tax. That is the way it works out."'
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of the Pennsylvania Community Property Act in Willcox v.
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., Justice Horace Stern, writing for the
court, expressed a similar view:
[I]t is not contended that the legislature may not establish a
common ownership of the earnings of the husband and wife
accruing in the future, it being recognized that, while the hus-
band is usually the breadwinner, the wife, by her management
of the household and rearing of the children, makes it possible
for the husband to devote himself more freely to his income-
producing activities; this justifies the pooling of their resources
thus derived from what is essentially a common enterprise.1
7
176. S. 137, 63rd Sess., at 3226 (Pa. 1947).
177. Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa. 1947).
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An Oklahoma House member expressed similar beliefs. In the only
available legislative statement outside of Pennsylvania, Oklahoma House
member Mr. Sherman explained,
In its original form community of property between hus-
band and wife is that system whereby the property which
husband and wife have, is common property, that is, it belongs
to both by halves. The community system is a result of cul-
tural and economic conditions. It is not the system of the
savages where a woman is little more than a chattel, nor is it
the system of the titled aristocracy, where a woman is some-
thing to adorn the castle and to bear children, preferably male.
It belongs to the country where the wife works shoulder to
shoulder with the husband in making a living and acquiring
such property as their joints [sic] efforts will achieve. Such is
[sic] the cultural and economic conditions in which we live.
Who can say that in the operation of a farm, the work of a
doctor, lawyer or other professional man, that the wife does
not work as long and as hard as her partner, her husband? It is
true that she does not in all cases do the same kind of work as
her husband, but she does do the work that enables the other to
devote his time to his particular work. One is as important as
the other and the joint results should be shared equally. The
wife always shares the misfortunes and hardships and why
should she not also share in the profits and gains?17 8
It appears that Mr. Lord, Justice Stern, and Mr. Sherman were
mindful of wives' contributions in the home.'79 Unlike The New York
178. H. 20, 59th Sess., at 2134 (Okla. 1945) (emphasis added).
179. Even more people expressed similar views in the 1930s. When, in 1933, the Treasury
urged Congress to pass a law defining the taxable unit as the family, rather than the
individual, the eight, original community property states invoked states' rights and
argued that it was within their purview of the states' authority to define personhood.
In a heated exchange before the House Ways and Means Committee, Representative
Frank Crowther of New York posited to Tom Connally, a Senator from Texas and
spokesman of the community property states, "8 of the 48 states ... have been held
to permit each spouse to report one half of the community income, although it was
all earned by and was expended under the control of the husband." Connally re-
sponded,
That is not true. I don't care whether the Treasury says it or who said it, it
is not true, and as to that under our law it is nor all earned by the husband;
it is joint earnings of the wife who stays at home, raises the children and
helps economize in the kitchen; she is contributing just as much to the
success of the husband as the husband is.
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Times commentator, George Lawton, who opined that a married
woman's boredom resulted from her working neither in business nor in
the home, Mr. Lord, Justice Stern, and Mr. Sherman purportedly
thought a wife's work in the home was significant enough to be worth at
least part of her husband's salary.
Yet, the belief that women substantially contributed in the home is
not inconsistent with the idea that working, married women posed a
threat to their husbands and to society, generally. Putting a community
property regime in place would go far in building confidence in married
women that their role as homemakers was valuable-worth up to half of
their husbands' salaries-and if married women could achieve signifi-
cant self-worth in the home, then they would be reluctant to enter the
workforce. The lawmakers' mixed motives are apparent in at least one
instance: The day following the passage of the Community Property Act
in Pennsylvania, Mr. Lord, the bill's sponsor, explained,
Mr. and Mrs. John Jones are a happily married couple. Mr.
Jones makes $10,000 a year. His wife keeps house. She has no
income.
Under the Community Property Act, Mrs. Jones is entitled
to half her husband's income. She may never see it, but half of
the $10,000 is hers just the same."O
This is not to say that the legislators' primary reason for enacting
the community property laws was to keep women out of the workforce,
or even to suggest a reason about which the legislators of Michigan, Ne-
braska, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Pennsylvania were cognizant. But, it is
to say that the social attitudes of the day made enacting such laws possi-
ble. The enactment of the community property laws in Michigan,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Pennsylvania could be seen as con-
sistent with a larger effort to push women back into their pre-war roles
as homemakers and faithful wives. Inroads toward that effort were
See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note t, at 180. Kessler-Harris suggests that Connally's
comments were "perhaps merely instrumental." Id. at 179-80. This suggestion is
plausible, not only because the community property states were attempting to avoid
higher taxes (as Kessler-Harris suggests), but also because the benefit to building con-
fidence in homemaking during the Depression was just as much as, if not greater
than, the benefit in the 1940s. After the Depression, married, working women were
perceived as a direct economic threat to the economic vitality of husbands and the
nation, and building confidence in homemaking would keep them out of the work-
force. See supra text accompanying notes 143-148.
180. Senate Passes Community Property Act for Penna., THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, PA),
May 28, 1947, at 8 (emphasis added).
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manifest in women's post-war-clothing designs. "Postwar clothing styles
projected an image which both exaggerated women's specifically female
features and enveloped them in garments which were restrictive and im-
practical."181 Skirts were made longer and more voluminous; shoes were
made with narrower toes and higher heels; and the new figure-forming
clothing necessitated corsets, wire brassieres, and other uncomfortable
undergarments. 1
8 2
Not only was such apparel impractical for the factory work in
which women had been engaged during the war, but it was also imprac-
tical for doing household chores. The impractical fashions of the day
were in conflict with other efforts to make women feel "at home" again
by making domestic duties easier with newly developed household ap-
pliances. Washing machines, clothing dryers, and dishwashers flooded
the market during the prosperous, post-war era.' Levitt homes made
owning a household appliance effortless, as they all came equipped with
a Bendix washing machine. 4 Some wives found a life of domesticity
attractive after the trauma of the war years, 185 and it became possible for
these wives to have it all: to maintain a feminine appearance, to fulfill
efficiently their household duties, and at the end of the day, to stake a
claim, theoretically, to half of their husbands' earnings.
C Community Property, Pulp Fiction?
The promises of a community property regime, however, were illu-
sory, just as were the premises upon which community property laws
were based. Although a community property regime resulted in a tax
liability for husbands and wives that was the same as if they actually split
their households' income, husbands probably did not intend actually to
hand over half their income to their wives. 18 6
In addition, although under a community property system half of
the communal property belonged to the wife, including the husband's
earnings, the management and control of such property traditionally
had been vested in the husband. (Pennsylvania was slightly more gener-
181. HARTMANN, supra note 108, at 203.
182. Id. at 204.
183. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 156.
184. Id. at 142.
185. See id. at 147-48.
186. Except, perhaps, Mr. Earl, who entered a contract to split his income with his wife in
1901-before the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
allowed the federal government to impose a federal income tax-without any hope of
receiving preferential tax treatment. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930).
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ous to wives, but nonetheless provided that the husband shall have
management and control over all community property "which is not
conferred upon the wife.") Thus, even if enacting a community prop-
erty regime transferred half of a husband's salary to his wife, it had little
effect on the right to manage and control that income. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that some of the Pennsylvania legislators thought the
Community Property Act confusing and "absurd.""' Nonetheless, the
Community Property Act passed in both the House and the Senate:
thirty-five to fourteen in the Senate, 188 and 123 to sixty-nine in the
House.' 9
Claims that the Act was confusing and absurd turned out to be well
founded. About four and a half months after the enactment of the
community property legislation, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
Willcox, found the law unconstitutional, in part because the Act was so
"uncertain and contradictory on its terms ... as to be, ... inoperative
and incapable of execution."'1 90
The plaintiffs brought the suit as a test case to determine the con-
stitutionality of the newly passed legislation,19' and the somewhat
complicated facts of the case indicate as much. Mr. Shippen Lewis held
a life insurance policy with the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company.
Among his rights under the policy was the right to borrow against it and
the right to assign the policy to another.'92 Mr. Lewis was married to
Mary F. W. Lewis at the time the policy was issued to him.11 3 After the
Community Property Act took effect, Mr. Lewis paid in advance the
annual premium on his life insurance policy with money derived from
three sources: a trust Mr. Lewis held as a life tenant, a dividend payment
on stock Mr. Lewis owned, and cash. 9 Mr. Lewis notified Penn Mutual
that he derived the income from multiple sources. He received the in-
come from the trust and the dividend payment after the September 1,
187. See H. 137, 77th Sess., at 5564 (Pa. 1947). House member, Mr. Brown, noted, "I say
to you that this is the most ridiculous and absurd piece of legislation presented to this
General Assembly in this session. It is so absurd that the clarifying amendments pre-
sented by the Majority Leader to this House yesterday, which attempted to clear up
the bill, were withdrawn by him upon his own motion." Id.
188. See S. 137, 63rd Sess., at 3230 (Pa. 1947).
189. See H. 137, 77th Sess., at 5571 (Pa. 1947).
190. Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d at 521, 528-30 (Pa. 1947).
191. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 524. The court noted, "the suit is obviously a friendly one among
all the parties." Id.
192. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 523.
193. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 523.
194. Wilcox, 55 A.2d at 523.
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1947 effective date of the Act, but he owned the cash prior to such
date.195
Mr. Lewis paid the premium, and on the very same day, he as-
signed the rights under the policy to Plaintiff, Mark Willcox.'96 Mr.
Willcox then sought to exchange the policy for one completely paid-up
and take a loan against the policy. 19 7 The insurance company, however,
refused to issue him a new policy or grant him the loan unless Mrs.
Lewis agreed. The company reasoned that "since it had been notified
that parts of the premium payment apparently consisted of community
property of Mr. Lewis and his wife, [Mrs. Lewis] had a legal interest in
the value of the policy which limited [Mr. Lewis's] right to assign it
without her consent."'98 Mr. Willcox sought a mandatory injunction,
requiring Penn Mutual to issue him the new, paid-up policy and grant
him the loan.' 9
The question that arose was whether, under these facts, the income
derived from Mr. Lewis's trust and stock constituted community prop-
erty. Although Mr. Lewis owned the trust and stock prior to his
marriage, and thus they remained his separate property, 00 the income
accruing from this property and used to pay the premium was received
after his marriage and, thus, was arguably community property.
The court held the Act unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) the
Act violated both state and federal due process of law,20' (2) the Act was
so "uncertain and contradictory in its terms ... as to be ... inoperative
and incapable of execution, 2 2 and (3) a violation of the community
property rights of the wife by the husband did not give rise to remedial
relief by the wife.20 3
First, the court reasoned, the operation of the community property
law violated both the federal and the Pennsylvania constitution because
it retroactively accomplished an "involuntary transfer" of property with-
195. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 523.
196. Wilcox, 55 A.2d at 523.
197. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 523. The policy Mr. Willcox received from Mr. Lewis had pay-
ments still to be made on it; Mr. Willcox sought to receive a fully paid-up policy with
a price equal to the cash surrender value of the policy he received from Mr. Lewis. See
id.
198. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 524.
199. Wilcox, 55 A.2d at 524.
200. Act of July 7, 1947, supra note 10, at § 4.
201. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 525-28.
202. Wilcox, 55 A.2d at 528.
203. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 530-31. The court also noted that community property law,
derived from civil law, conflicted with the otherwise common law principles of the
state, calling community property laws "exotic," "alien," and "foreign." Id. at 524
(quoting COMMUNITY PROPERTY lST, supra note 35, at 4).
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out compensation and thus violated due process.0 4 The court noted that
had the legislature attempted to transform the separate property of the
husband or wife, owned by either prior to marriage, into community
property, such an enactment would be clearly unconstitutional. 0 ' The
transformation of fiture income was no different than a transformation
of separate property into community property.' °6 However, the court
commented,
[I]t is not contended that the legislature may not establish a
common ownership of the earnings of the husband and wife
accruing in the future, it being recognized that, while the hus-
band is usually the breadwinner, the wife, by her management
of the household and rearing of the children, makes it possible
for the husband to devote himself more freely to his income-
producing activities; this justifies the pooling of their resources
thus derived from what is essentially a common enterprise. 07
Thus, the court took issue not with the general assignment of in-
come to the community, but rather with the retroactive nature of the
Act and the ability to transfer the income from separate property into
community property. It is also interesting to note that traditionally the
Spanish system, as well as some of the systems of the eight original
community property states, had provided that the profits of separate
property were communal property.2 08
In addition to finding the enactment a violation of due process, the
court concluded that the act was "uncertain and contradictory in its
terms" and thus "inoperative and incapable of execution. 2 09 The court
reasoned that although one provision of the Act, Section three, provided
that property acquired during marriage and after the Act's effective date
shall be the community property of both the husband and wife, each
with a vested "undivided one-half interest," the remaining provisions of
the Act were in conflict, and, consequently, "each spouse is not in reality
204. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 526.
205. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 526.
206. See Willcox, 55 A.2d at 526.
207. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 527.
208. The court noted that some states did, in fact, allow for the separate property or the
income derived from a husband's or wife's separate property to be transformed into
community property; however, these states effected such a transformation by opera-
tion of their constitutions, not legislation in the face of an opposing constitutional due
process claim. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 527.
209. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 528.
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given an undivided one-half interest in the so-called community or
,,210
common property.
The court opined that to own property-that is, to have an interest
in property-was to have the right to "possess, use, enjoy and dispose" of
such property.21 The Community Property Act, however, did not truly
give to the husband or wife the ability to possess, use, or enjoy commu-
nity property. Another section of the Act, Section four, merely gave the
husband and wife rights he or she would have had, regardless of the
Act-the management and control and ability to dispose of property
that he or she would have exclusively owned. 2
First, the court noted that the law did not provide any limit on the
extent to which the husband could control and manage property charac-
terized as marital community property. 2" The court explained,
[U]nder Spanish law the husband's administration of the
community property must be directed to the preservation and
use of it for the common benefit of himself and his wife and
may not be exercised to the latter's prejudice. But the general-
ity of the Pennsylvania act does not admit of the adoption of
such a qualified construction .... 214
Instead, the Pennsylvania statute could be construed to allow the
husband to manage and control property that the Act characterized as
community property (but that remained under his control and man-
agement) with no responsibility to the marital community.
Second, the court concluded that the Community Property Act did
not truly give a spouse the right to dispose of community property. If
property that was characterized as community property nonetheless re-
mained under the management and control of only one spouse with no
accountability to the other, then this deprived the other of the right to
dispose of such property. Although the court acknowledged that the
Act's deficiencies applied equally to husbands and wives, 2'5 it seemedconcrne priariy wth te cnseuencs fr " 216
concerned primarily with the consequences for wives. As part of a se-
210. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 528.
211. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 528.
212. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 528.
213. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 528-29.
214. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 528-29.
215. See Wilcox, 55 A.2d at 528-29 ("An even more glaring lack of the incidents of own-
ership exists by reason of the power given to the husband (or wife, as the case may be)
to dispose of community property.").
216. It is interesting to note that throughout its opinion the court notes parenthetically
that its analysis applies both to wives and husbands, yet the court chooses to explain
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ries of rhetorical questions about the extent of the husband's ability to
dispose of community property, the court asked, "Is the husband to be
permitted to expend community property in the indulgence of extrava-
gant tastes of his own, as, for example, for extensive pleasure trips, or the
purchase of jewelry or other luxuries, or in the pursuit of gambling?"2" '
Finally, the court invalidated the Act because neither a husband
nor a wife could seek remedial relief for a violation by the other of his or
her duties to administer, control, or dispose of the communal prop-
erty."' The Pennsylvania statute only allowed a husband or wife to sue
the other in a proceeding for divorce or "to protect or recover his sepa-11219
rate property. The court explained,
Even if... a wife in Pennsylvania did have any actual, vested
interest in the community property over which her husband
had the power of disposition and which was subject to the
rights of his creditors, she would not have any right of redress
or appeal to the courts as long as the marriage existed, no mat-
ter what predatory and illegal acts he might commit with
220
respect to such property.
Thus, finding that the Community Property Act violated due proc-
ess while creating very little, if anything, in the way of real property
rights for wives (and husbands), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in-
validated the law. Because the Act did not contain a severability clause,
the court invalidated the law in its entirety.2 ' If the legislature wanted
women to have community property rights, it would have to draft en-
tirely new legislation.
Although the Pennsylvania Community Property Act was unusual
when compared to the community property regimes in other states,222 it
the problems posed by the statute from the perspective of the wife. See Willcox, 55
A.2d 527 passim. This might suggest that the court concluded that, had the statute
met constitutional muster, the likely thrust of it was to give more rights to wives, and
consequently, the failings of the statute primarily fell on wives. This is not clear,
however.
217. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 529.
218. Wilkcox, 55 A.2d at 530.
219. Wilkcox, 55 A.2d at 530 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
220. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 530.
221. Wilkcox, 55 A.2d at 527-28, 531.
222. Justice Stern acknowledged that there were Supreme Court cases in which commu-
nity property laws with some characteristics similar to the Pennsylvania Community
Property Act were upheld. Willcox, 55 A.2d at 601-02. Justice Stern noted, however,
that the Pennsylvania Community Property Act was unusual, in comparison to the
laws considered in prior cases, because it contained multiple oddities, all of which had
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is difficult to know whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
have invalidated the Act even if the Act's oddities did not exist. The
court appears to have been interested in the rights of women and only
wholly invalidated the law because no severability clause existed. Yet, the
imposition of a community property regime in what was once a com-
mon law jurisdiction could have caused significant confusion for
husbands, wives, lawyers, and those administering the laws. What is cer-
tain is that the Pennsylvania legislature crafted a law that attempted to
put a community property regime in place that only minimally changed
the rights of husbands and wives but had the potential to improve
women's morale.
CONCLUSION
The passage and quick repeal of the community property laws in
Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon following the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1948 suggest that the passage of the community
property laws in these states, as well as in Pennsylvania, simply served as
a tax saving measure. Certainly, some of the Pennsylvania legislators,
members of the ABA, and other commentators believed that one of the
virtues of a community property regime was the preferential tax treat-
ment. However, the passage of these laws simultaneously served to
reinforce the institution of marriage because only married couples re-
ceived the preferential tax treatment. In addition, the community
property laws served to reinforce women's roles as homemakers, as their
household responsibilities theoretically entitled them to half of their
husbands' salaries. At least some women, who in the aftermath of the
trauma of the war sought the security of a domestic life, found this com-
forting. In addition, it assuaged society's fears of married, working
women and the harm they could cause to their husbands by taking jobs
away from them, to their children by being away from home, and to the
nation by undermining the institution of marriage and weakening the
American citizen's security in the wake of the Cold War. That the
community property laws would effectively push women back into the
pre-war roles was-if not part of the rationale for why the laws were
enacted-at the least, what made the enactment of such laws possible. t
unfavorable consequences for women. "From the opinions in these cases it would ap-
pear, therefore, that in none of the States whose laws were thus appraised were all the
factors present which exist in the Pennsylvania Community Property Law as herein
previously discussed." Id. at 602. Thus, despite the Supreme Court precedent, invali-
dating the Pennsylvania Act was justified.
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